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RESUMO As emissões metafictivas despertam intuições de verdade, as 
quais representam um problema para uma teoria que combine uma posição 
referencialista quanto aos nomes próprios com um compromisso antirrealista 
quanto às personagens de ficção. O objetivo deste artigo é proporcionar uma 
solução para este problema no âmbito da teoria de arquivos mentais. De acordo 
com a posição desenvolvida, enquanto as emissões metafictivas expressam 
literalmente uma proposição incompleta, comunicam pragmaticamente uma 
proposição completa, a qual explica as intuições de verdade. A proposição 
pragmaticamente comunicada, argumentarei, é “metarrepresentacional”, no 
sentido de que é sobre uma representação mental ou arquivo mental.
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ABSTRACT Metafictive utterances raise a kind of intuitions (intuitions 
of truthfulness) that pose a problem for a view that combines a referentialist 
approach to proper names with an antirealist stance on fictional characters. 
In this article I attempt to provide a solution to this problem within the 
framework of mental files. According to my position, metafictive utterances 
literally express an incomplete proposition while pragmatically conveying a 
complete one, which accounts for the intuitions of truthfulness. The proposition 
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pragmatically conveyed is ‘metarepresentational’, I’ll argue, in the sense that 
it is about a mental representation or mental file.
Keywords Mental Files, Metafictive utterances, Fictional Names.
1 Preliminaries
Consider the following utterances:
(1) Santa Claus became famous because of the Coca-Cola Company.
(2)	Santa	Claus	is	a	fictional	character.	
(3)	Father	Christmas	is	a	fictional	character.	
(4)	Batman	is	a	fictional	character.	
Following Bonomi (2008), i will dub utterances such as (1)-(4) as 
metafictive.	 He	 distinguishes	 three	 kinds	 of	 utterances	 involving	 fictional	
names: fictive, parafictive and metafictive.1 Fictive utterances occur in the 
context	of	the	creation	of	a	work	of	fiction	and	they	are	intuitively	non	truth-
evaluable,	for	they	are	not	considered	serious	assertions	but	a	different	kind	
of	 speech	 act,	 related	 to	 fiction-making.	 Parafictive	 utterances,	 in	 turn,	 are	
content-reporting; their goal is to accurately represent how things are within 
a	fictional	story.	Thus,	parafictive	utterances	are	often	said	to	be	true within 
the story, or true in the context of the story and sometimes they are thought 
to	be	equivalent	 to	a	sentence	 that	contains	a	fictional	operator	such	as	“In	
the	story,......”.	Finally,	we	have	metafictive	utterances	such	as	(1)-(4).	Unlike	
parafictive	utterances,	metafictive	utterances	are	not	content-reporting,	so	they	
are intuitively true (or false) with respect to the context of the real world, not 
with respect to the information provided by the story. As a matter of fact, the 
information provided by the story is completely irrelevant in order to assign 
to	(1)-(4)	a	truth	value.	As	Bonomi	claims	(2008),	in	metafictive	utterances	
the story and its characters are the objects of discourse, not the context with 
respect to which the utterance is to be evaluated. 
Now,	metafictive	 utterances	 such	 as	 (1)-(4)	 raise	 at	 least	 two	 kinds	 of	
intuitions -cf. everett (2003). on the one hand, they raise intuitions of same-
saying. We have the intuition that (2) and (3) say the same thing, but something 
different	from	(4).	On	the	other	hand,	they	raise	intuitions	of	truthfulness,	that	
is, we have the intuition that (1)-(4) are truth-evaluable. As everett claims 
1 In fact, Bonomi employs the words ‘textual’, ‘paratextual’ and ‘metatextual’. I changed the terminology to 
‘fictive’, ‘parafictive’ and ‘metafictive’, but there is no theoretical or conceptually relevant difference.
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“any	 acceptable	 account	 of	 empty	names	will	 either	 have	 to	 accommodate	
them, or explain them away” (everett 2003, p. 2). now, although both sets of 
intuitions raise interesting questions and should be accounted for, in this work 
i will only be concerned with the intuitions of truthfulness.2
referentialism about proper names holds that the only semantic 
contribution of a proper name to the semantic content of an utterance in which 
it occurs is its referent. typically, referentialism is in tandem with a russellian 
view of propositions, that is, the view that propositions are structured entities 
constituted by objects, properties and relations arranged in a certain way. 
on this view, utterances containing a proper name express a proposition 
partly constituted by the object which is the bearer of the name. now, many 
philosophers	also	advocate	the	view	that	fictional	names	are	genuinely	empty,	
that	 is,	 that	 there	are	no	fictional	characters	 that	are	 the	bearers	of	fictional	
names (be that possible objects, non-existent objects or abstract artifacts, 
among others). these three thesis taken together (referentialism, a russellian 
view	of	propositions	and	antirealism	concerning	fictional	characters)	make	it	
hard to account for intuitions of truthfulness concerning utterances (1)-(4).3 
If	antirealism	is	correct,	then	fictional	names	are	genuinely	empty,	thus	they	
make no contribution to the proposition expressed by utterances containing 
them (referentialism), so it seems that those utterances do not express complete 
truth-conditions (russellian view of propositions), contrary to our intuitions. 
The	challenge	is	then	either	to	explain	the	intuitions	away	or	to	find	a	suitable	
content that allows us to take the intuitions at face value.
the aim of this article is to present a solution to the problem, within the 
framework	of	mental	files,	in	line	with	the	second	option.	In	the	next	section	
I	will	sketch	the	framework	of	mental	files,	and	I	will	rephrase	the	problem	
within that framework. in the third section, i will discuss recanati’s idea 
of metarepresentation. in the fourth section i will present my own account, 
according	 to	 which	 metafictive	 utterances	 pragmatically	 convey	 closed	
metarepresentational singular thoughts. Finally, i will draw some conclusions.
2 For an account of the first kind of intuitions within the framework of mental files see Friend (2011, ms). For 
discussion of Friend’s theory and a different proposal see Salis (2013). The proposal I develop in this article 
remains neutral w.r.t the question of which is the best way of accounting for the intuitions of same-saying, 
and is compatible with both Friend’s and Salis’ approaches.
3 Referentialism, a Russellian view of propositions and antirealism about fictional characters are not 
uncontroversial philosophical thesis, but a full defense of them is far beyond the possibilities of a single 
article. Referentialism is a widely held view in contemporary philosophy of language, and a Russellian view 
of propositions has been suggested by very influential philosophers within that framework (see Kaplan, 
1989, pp. 494-495, Salmon, 1986, and Soames, 1985, 1987). For a defense of antirealism see (Everett, 
2005; 2013).
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2 Mental Files
The	mental	 file	metaphor	 has	 been	 elaborated	 by	 several	 philosophers	
in	different	ways.	One	recent	and	influential	account	of	mental	files	is	that	of	
recanati (2012).4 According to this view, entertaining a singular thought just is 
to	entertain	a	thought	that	deploys	a	mental	file.	Mental	files	are	singular,	non-
descriptive modes of presentation that enable us to gain and store information 
about	objects.	Mental	files	do	not	refer	satisfactionally,	however	(that	 is,	 to	
whatever	object	satisfies	the	information	contained	in	the	file),	but	relationally	
(they refer to the object to which the subject stands in a certain epistemically 
rewarding relation to). now, concerning singular terms in natural language 
recanati says 
What about singular terms in language? they occur in sentences, and sentences 
express (and elicit) thoughts. From the interpreter‘s point of view, to understand a 
sentence is to entertain a thought. if the sentence contains a singular term referring 
to an object a,	thinking	the	relevant	thought	involves	deploying	a	file	also	referring	
to a. (recanati, ms, pp. 1-2)
The	framework	maintains	referentialism	and	russellianism	for	mental	files	
and	 thoughts:	first,	 analogously	 to	 singular	 terms,	 the	file	 sole	contribution	
to the content (i.e. the truth-conditions) of the thought in which it occurs is 
the object to which it refers; secondly, analogously to utterances, singular 
thoughts express singular russellian propositions partly constituted by the 
object	which	is	the	referent	of	the	file.
Now	we	 can	 restate	 the	 problem	 of	metafictive	 utterances	 in	 terms	 of	
mental	files:	according	to	the	mental	file	framework	understanding	a	sentence	
that contains a singular term referring to ‘a’ consists in entertaining a singular 
thought	 that	 deploys	 a	mental	 file	 referring	 to	 the	 very	 same	object.	Thus,	
understanding	 a	 metafictive	 utterance	 consists	 in	 entertaining	 a	 singular	
thought	that	deploys	a	mental	file	referring	to	the	same	object	as	the	fictional	
name.	Now,	 if	fictional	names	are	genuinely	empty	 then	 the	corresponding	
files	are	also	empty,	thus,	the	relevant	thought,	that	is,	the	thought	we	should	
entertain in order to understand the utterance, does not express a truth-
conditional content. Again, this goes against our intuitions. 
Let	me	put	it	in	other	words.	Metafictive	utterances	are	intuitively	truth-
evaluable,	so	when	we	understand	a	metafictive	utterance	we	should,	according	
to	the	mental	file	framework,	entertain	a	thought	that	is	truth-evaluable.	But	
4 For different ways of elaborating the metaphor see Perry (2001) and Jeshion (2010).
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the	mental	file	that	corresponds	to	an	empty	name	is	also	empty	and	the	file’s	
sole semantic contribution to the proposition expressed by the thought is its 
referent.	 Thus,	 we	 have	 the	 intuition	 that	 metafictive	 utterances	 are	 truth-
evaluable but we cannot account for it in terms of the thoughts elicited by the 
utterance,	as	it	is	expected	within	the	mental	file	framework.	Now,	after	briefly	
discussing recanati’s view in the third section, i will propose in section 4 a 
way	of	amending	the	mental	file	framework	in	order	to	satisfactorily	account	
for	metafictive	utterances.
3 Recanati about empty singular terms and thoughts
in his (ms) recanati discusses some cases of thoughts and utterances 
containing	empty	files	and	singular	terms.	Though	he	is	not	concerned	with	
metafictive	utterances	but	with	attitude	reports,	it	is	worth	considering	what	
he says about it, for it will be helpful for presenting my own proposal. As we 
have already said, utterances containing empty singular terms elicit singular 
thoughts (that is, the subject thinks via a	mental	file)	but	 it	seems	that	 they	
do not express complete truth-conditions, for in the absence of an object the 
thought does not express a singular proposition. However, it is well known that 
sometimes uttering a sentence that contains an empty singular term does not 
prevent one from expressing a truth-evaluable content. the kind of example 
recanati is interested in is
(5) Leverrier thought that the discovery of Vulcan would make him 
famous.
to explain how we can account for the truth-conditions of an utterance 
like (5) in terms of the thoughts elicited by it, recanati postulates a derived 
function	 of	mental	 files.	 The	 primary	 function	 of	 a	mental	 file	 is	 to	 serve	
as a repository of information about a single individual to which it refers, 
information that is gained through the epistemically rewarding relation that 
individuates	the	file’s	type.	However,	Recanati	claims,	files	can	play	derived	
functions.	 One	 such	 function	 is	 a	 metarepresentational	 one:	 files	 allow	 us	
to think about objects in the world but also allow us to represent how other 
subjects think about objects in the world. this function is supposed to explain 
all ‘intentional’ uses of singular terms. in order to provide such an explanation 
the notion of indexed file is	 needed.	An	 indexed	 file	 consists	 of	 a	 file	 and	
an	 index:	 the	 file	 is	 the	 file	 that	 another	 subject	 uses	 in	 thinking	 about	 an	
object,	the	index	refers	to	the	subject	to	whom	the	file	belongs.	By	appealing	
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to	 indexed	 files,	 Recanati	 accounts	 for	 difficult	 cases	 involving	 attitude’s	
ascriptions, negative existentials and Geach cases. 
A	further	distinction	is	between	‘loaded’	and	‘unloaded’	indexed	files.	A	
‘loaded’	indexed	file	is	an	indexed	file	that	is	linked	to	a	regular	file	referring	to	
the	same	thing,	in	the	mind	of	the	subject.	In	those	cases	the	file	has	existential	
import	and	 it	preserves	 the	 reference	 it	has	 in	 the	 subject	 to	whom	 the	file	
belongs. in that case, the subject has two ways of thinking of the object: on the 
one	hand	her	own	file,	on	the	other,	a	vicarious	file	indexed	to	another	subject.	
‘Unloaded’	indexed	files	are	indexed	files	that	are	not	linked	to	a	regular	file	
in	the	mind	of	the	subject;	those	indexed	files	do	not	have	existential	import.	
‘Unloaded’	files	are	fully	opaque,	that	is,	they	do	not	refer	to	anything.	There	
are for recanati only two cases in which an utterance containing a singular 
term	is	associated	with	an	‘unloaded’	indexed	file:	
First option: the utterance does not express a genuine thought, but only a ‘mock 
thought’, as Frege puts it. if i say to my children: ‘Santa Claus is coming tonight’, 
i do not express a genuine singular thought. i only pretend to refer to Santa Claus, 
and to predicate something of him. (the same thing is arguably true if, echoing my 
children,	I	tell	my	wife:	‘Santa	Claus	is	coming	tonight’.	Here	the	file	associated	with	
‘Santa Claus’ is indexed to Santa-Claus believers and unloaded, so the whole speech 
act has to be seen as a form of pretense.) Second option: the utterance expresses 
a thought that is globally metarepresentational – it is about someone‘s, e.g. my 
children‘s, representations, rather than about what these representations are about. 
this corresponds to pseudo-singular belief ascriptions. i think negative (and positive) 
existentials too are meta-representational... (recanati, ms, p. 16)
Unfortunately,	 the	derived	metarepresentational	function	of	files,	 in	the	
way	Recanati	presents	it,	does	not	seem	adequate	to	account	for	metafictive	
utterances.	On	the	first	option,	the	whole	speech	act	is	analysed	as	a	form	of	
pretense.	Now,	 this	 is	plausible	for	fictive	or	parafictive	utterances,	such	as	
‘Santa Claus is coming tonight’ (said by a father to his children in order to 
generate	expectations	on	them),	but	it	doesn’t	seem	to	fit	well	with	metafictive	
utterances in general. Suppose that believing that my son is old enough to know 
the	truth	I	say	to	him,	“Son,	Santa	Claus	is	a	fictional	character”.	It	would	be	at	
least	controversial	to	claim	that	in	saying	“Santa	Claus	is	a	fictional	character”	
the whole speech act is just a form of pretense, i.e. that i’m just pretending 
“that	there	is	a	character	named	Santa	Claus	and	pretending	to	predicate	about	
him	that	it	is	a	fictional	character”.	To	the	contrary,	my	assertion	seems	to	be	
as serious as it gets. Furthermore, claiming that the whole act is just a form 
of	pretense	 is	at	odds	with	one	of	 the	features	of	metafictive	utterances	we	
pointed	out	before,	namely,	that	metafictive	utterances	seem	to	be	true	in	the	
context of real world. 
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The	 second	 option	 does	 not	 fare	 better.	Metafictive	 utterances	 are	 not	
globally	metarepresentational,	that	is,	in	saying	that	Santa	Claus	is	a	fictional	
character	with	a	metafictive	force	I	am	not	ascribing	to	anyone	the	pseudo-
singular	belief	that	Santa	Claus	is	a	fictional	character,	for	it	is	me who has that 
belief.	When	I	said	to	my	son	‘Santa	Claus	is	a	fictional	character’	I	am	not	
ascribing	him	the	pseudo-singular	belief	that	Santa	Claus	is	fictional	character,	
but	trying	to	communicate	my	belief	to	him.	It	is	sufficiently	clear	that	there	
are	at	least	some	metafictive	utterances	that	do	not	have	the	form	of	an	attitude	
report nor can be interpreted as (pseudo-singular) belief ascriptions.
A	 third	 option	 could	 be	 that	 the	 thought	 expressed	 by	 a	 metafictive	
utterance is only locally metarepresentational, that is, when i say to my 
son	 ‘Santa	Claus	 is	 a	fictional	character’	 I	deploy	a	file	 that	does	not	have	
existential	 import	but	 is	nevertheless	 linked	 to	one	of	my	own	regular	files	
(that	is,	it	is	linked	to	my	Santa	Claus’	file,	which	I	share,	in	a	sense,	with	my	
son). this possibility is precluded by recanati’s framework, however; on his 
account,	an	indexed	file	is	either	‘loaded’,	in	which	case	it’s	linked	to	a	regular	
file	in	the	subject’s	mind	and	has	existential	import,	or	‘unloaded’,	in	which	
case	it	does	not	have	existential	import	but	it’s	not	linked	to	a	regular	file	in	
the subject’s mind neither. 
So	 it	 seems	 that	 in	 performing	 metafictive	 utterances	 we	 are	 not	 just	
echoing how other person thinks about an object (for those cases are always 
‘loaded’, according to recanati), nor we are globally representing someone 
else’s	 belief	 (for	 metafictive	 utterances	 are	 not	 content-reporting)	 nor	 are	
we just pretending to assert something. thus, it seems that what recanati 
says	 about	 metarepresentation	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 account	 for	 metafictive	
utterances.	Still,	as	I’ll	argue	in	the	next	section,	a	different	but	related	idea	
of metarepresentation can be developed in order to solve the problem of 
metafictive	utterances.
4 Open Metarepresentation vs. Closed Metarepresentation
in the previous section i reviewed some of the ideas about 
metarepresentation elaborated by recanati in order to account for several 
cases involving empty singular terms and thoughts. i argued, however, that it 
is	not	plausible	to	extend	that	idea	in	order	to	cover	metafictive	utterances.	In	
this	section,	I	will	claim	that	a	different	but	related	idea	of	metarepresentation	
could	be	helpful	in	solving	the	problem	raised	by	metafictive	utterances	within	
the	framework	of	mental	files.
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i want to introduce a distinction between open metarepresentation and 
closed metarepresentation. this distinction parallels that between open and 
closed quotation.5 in open quotation, the agent uses the quotation marks to 
represent how other subject thinks about an object, or what she says about an 
object. For example:
(6) Hey, ‘your sister’ is coming over.
one can use (6) in order to say that Ann is coming over, knowing that Ann 
is not the addressee’s sister, with the intention of ironically echoing how a 
third partner thinks about Ann. recanati thinks of metarepresentation in 
analogy with open quotation. the thought involved in the comprehension of 
an utterance such as (6) is metarepresentational in recanati’s sense because 
the speaker is echoing another subject’s way of thinking about Ann. in the 
following passage recanati makes this analogy clear:
Standardly, quotations are opaque: the expression in quotes refers to itself, rather than 
to its ordinary referent. this, at least, is true of the central class of quotations which 
i dubbed closed quotations. Indexed files behave differently. While indexed, the file 
still refers to its ordinary referent, that is, it still refers to the object the simulated file 
is about. In standard instances of opaque attitude attribution, a singular term in the 
embedded clause evokes a file in the ascribee‘s mind and refers to the referent of that 
file (not to the file itself) [...] Indexed files can still be treated as a quotational device, 
but the type of quotation at issue has to be open quotation, not closed quotation. 
Open quotations have an echoic character but, typically, the quoted words keep their 
ordinary meaning and reference while evoking or echoing the words of some other 
person or persons. (recanati, ms, p. 15, my emphasis)
However, as i have previously argued, open metarepresentation is not enough 
in	 order	 to	 account	 for	metafictive	 utterances.	 It	 seems	 that	 in	 saying	 that	
Santa	Claus	 is	a	fictional	character	 I	am	not	merely	echoing	my	son’s	way	
of thinking about Santa Claus, nor ascribing him the pseudo-singular belief 
that	Santa	Claus	is	a	fictional	character,	nor	am	I	just	pretending	to	assert	that	
Santa	Claus	is	a	fictional	character.
Closed	quotation	behaves	differently.	Consider	the	following	sentences:
(8) Diego is tall. 
(9) ‘Diego’ has six letters. 
(8)	and	(9)	exemplify	the	well-known	difference	between	use	and	mention.	In	
the	first	case,	the	speaker	says	something	about	the	referent	of	the	name,	while	
5 See Recanati (2010, chapter 8) for further details.
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in the second case she says something about the linguistic representation 
‘Diego’. in closed quotation, the quotation marks are not used for echoing 
other subject’s way of speaking about an object, but for making the expression 
itself the object of the discourse. the speaker displays an expression in order 
to talk about the expression itself. Closed metarepresentation parallels closed 
quotation, although there is no mental analogous to the quotation marks. i claim 
that	an	agent	can	entertain	a	mental	file	with	a	closed	metarepresentational	
function,	 in	the	sense	that	 the	thought	 is	about	 the	file	itself.	So	sometimes	
when	a	subject	entertains	a	singular	thought,	she	deploys	a	mental	file	in	order	
to	think	about	the	file	itself,	that	is,	in	order	to	turn	the	representation	itself	
into	the	topic	of	the	thought.	In	those	cases,	the	mental	file	serves	both	as	a	
constituent of the thought and as part of its content: the proposition expressed 
by	 a	 thought	 containing	 a	 mental	 file	 with	 a	 closed	 metarepresentational	
function	contains	the	file	itself	as	a	constituent,	that	is,	it	has	the	file	itself	as	
its topic or subject matter. 
now, if we grant that we can have closed metarepresentational thoughts, 
I	will	 argue,	we	 can	 solve	 the	 problem	of	metafictive	 utterances.	The	 idea	
I	want	to	explore	is	that	metafictive	utterances	pragmatically	convey	closed	
metarepresentational thoughts: that is, although the literal content of a 
metafictive	utterance	 is	not	fully	propositional,	 there	 is	a	complete	singular	
proposition pragmatically conveyed, namely, the content of the closed 
metarepresentational singular thought entertained by the speaker. if this is 
correct we can honor the intuitions of truthfulness.
First	of	all,	a	speaker	competent	with	a	given	fictional	name	–let’s	say,	
‘Santa	 Claus’–	 entertains	 a	 singular	 thought	 that	 deploys	 the	 file	 SANTA	
CLAUS.	As	I	said	above,	sometimes	the	file	does	not	play	its	usual	referential	
function but a derived, (closed) metarepresentational one. in those cases, the 
thought that the speaker entertains is not intended by her neither as content-
reporting	(as	in	the	case	of	thoughts	that	correspond	to	parafictive	utterances)	
nor	as	fulfilling	its	usual	referential	function.	In	turn,	the	speaker	entertains	a	
singular mental representation in order to think about the representation itself. 
So for example, the speaker might entertain a singular thought that deploys 
the	file	SANTA	CLAUS,	knowing	in	advance	that	the	file	is	empty,	in	order	to	
ascribe the property ‘became famous because of the Coca-Cola company’ to 
the	file	SANTA	CLAUS	itself.	
then, the speaker utters, for example, something like (1). the closed 
metarepresentational thought entertained by the speaker is not the literal 
content of the utterance, though. As i said before, i maintain that, literally, 
metafictive	utterances	express	an	incomplete	content,	for	the	fictional	name	is	
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genuinely empty. in turn, i claim that the closed metarepresentational thought 
is pragmatically conveyed by the utterance. How does the process go? in the 
first	step	the	speaker	entertains	a	closed	metarepresentational	thought,	in	the	
sense previously explained. then, the speaker utters, for example, something 
like (1). As i said above, the semantics of (1) is not the same as that of the 
thought: (1) expresses only an incomplete or ‘gappy’ proposition, for the 
name is genuinely empty and thus it does not contribute anything to the 
truth-conditional content of the utterance. When the speaker utters (1) she 
intends	the	hearer	to	entertain	a	singular	thought	deploying	the	file	SANTA	
CLAUS.	Arguably,	upon	hearing	the	physical	 token	of	 the	name	the	hearer	
will infer that the speaker is thinking via a singular, non-descriptive mode of 
presentation, and that the speaker wants her to think about the object in the 
same way. this is due both to linguistic and psychological features of names.6 
So	 the	 hearer	will	 open	 a	mental	 file	 and	 label	 it	 with	 the	 name	 she	 took	
from the speaker. Following the example, upon hearing (1) the audience will 
produce	a	mental	token	of	that	sentence	and	will	open	a	mental	file	SANTA	
CLAUS	(or,	if	she	already	possesses	a	Santa	Claus’	file,	she	will	activate	it).	
on the other hand, when the speaker utters (1) she has the intention that the 
hearer infers a closed metarepresentational thought, a thought that is about the 
file	itself	and	expresses	the	proposition	that	SANTA CLAUS became famous 
because of The Coca Cola Company. So the speaker utters a sentence that 
expresses only a ‘gappy’ proposition but has the intention that the hearer 
form the same closed metarepresentational thought that she has. now, in the 
successful	cases	 the	speaker	utters	 (1)	with	a	metafictive	 intention	and this 
is mutually manifest for both speaker and hearer. thus, given the hearer’s 
recognition of the speaker’s intentions together with further knowledge of the 
context and the semantic information provided by her comprehension of the 
sentence, the hearer will typically be able to infer, in the face of an utterance 
like	(1),	a	thought	deploying	the	mental	file	SANTA	CLAUS	with	a	derived,	
closed metarepresentational function.
I	claimed	that	the	speaker,	in	performing	a	metafictive	utterance,	has	the	
intention to convey a closed metarepresentational thought; i claimed also 
that the hearer is in turn able to pragmatically infer the required thought. in 
order to make this work, it is important that the hearer is able to capture the 
6 Robin Jeshion (2009) argues that we tend to entertain singular thoughts in the face of tokens of proper 
names due to psychological features having to do with the significance we attribute to them. According 
to Recanati (1993), names exhibit a linguistic mark, REF, that signals their being expressions of singular 
reference. On his view, hearers are normatively bound, in virtue of linguistic features of those expressions, 
to think singularly about the object.
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speaker’s intentions. to grant that, the only thing we need to assume is that 
competent	speakers	are	able	to	differentiate	fictive,	parafictive	and	metafictive	
utterances in virtue of features of context, and this is not a very controversial 
assumption.	 In	effect,	 that	 the	speaker	has	 the	 intention	 to	convey	a	closed	
metarepresentational	 thought	 (that	 is,	 that	 the	 utterance	 is	 a	 metafictive	
one) might be the most relevant interpretation of her utterance. By way of 
illustration, consider an utterance of (1). First of all, we can plausibly assume 
that	the	hearer	is	able	to	reliably	dismiss	a	fictive	interpretation	of	(1)	just	by	
judging whether the conventional requisites for being a legitimate producer7 in 
the	Santa	Claus’	stories	are	fulfilled.	What	about	a	parafictive	interpretation?	
Suppose further that in the context it is common knowledge for speaker and 
hearer that in the story Santa Claus did not become famous because of the 
Coca	Cola	Company._	This	fact	precludes	a	parafictive	interpretation	on	the	
part of the hearer. the hearer will assume that the speaker, if she intends (1) 
as	a	parafictive	utterance,	will	try	to	stick	to	the	facts	of	the	story	and	will	not	
try to mislead the audience. So if the speaker explicitly states something that 
is false in the story and it is common knowledge that it is false in the story, 
then	she	surely	does	not	intend	the	utterance	as	parafictive.	Thus,	a	metafictive	
interpretation seems to be the only option left (besides, hearer’s further 
knowledge of context, including her knowledge of the speaker’s inferential 
behavior	 and	 dispositions	 to	 act,	 might	 make	 a	 metafictive	 interpretation	
the	 most	 relevant	 one).	 Now,	 as	 metafictive	 utterances	 exhibit	 a	 closed	
metarepresentational character, the hearer will infer a metarepresentational 
proposition	about	the	file	SANTA	CLAUS.	This	is	just	an	example.	Different	
circumstances might make it manifest for the hearer that the speaker has the 
intention to convey a closed metarepresentational thought. the important 
point	 is	 that	 to	grant	 regular	 speakers	 the	 ability	 to	 capture	 the	metafictive	
force of an utterance is not a very demanding condition.
So the proposal is that in uttering (1) the speaker pragmatically conveys a 
singular	metarepresentational	proposition.	In	a	first	step,	the	hearer	entertains	
a	singular	thought	that	deploys	the	mental	file	SANTA	CLAUS.	In	a	second	
step, the hearer goes (pragmatically) from this empty thought to a proposition 
that	includes	the	file	itself	as	a	constituent,	after	inferring	that	the	file	fulfills	in	
this occasion a closed metarepresentational function. i say that the proposition 
pragmatically inferred is singular	because	it	includes	the	file,	which	is	a	type	
of object. i say that the proposition is metarepresentational because it is about 
7 Adapting an idea from Evans (1982, ch. 11) to fit non-referring names, Friend (ms) defines producers as 
those who legitimately inject information about x into a network for x.
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a	file,	which	is	a	kind	of	mental	representation.	I	say	that	this	proposition	is	
pragmatically conveyed because it is not the literal content of the utterance by 
means of which it is communicated.
now, i claimed that it is the closed metarepresentational thought 
pragmatically conveyed the one that is the target of the intuitions of truthfulness. 
When a speaker utters (1) we have the intuition that the utterance is true/false 
because we pragmatically infer a closed metarepresentational thought that 
expresses	a	proposition	about	the	file	itself.	
A possible objection suggests itself though. it is not plausible, one might 
think,	that	what	a	speaker	is	saying	in	uttering	(1)	is	that	her	own	file	became	
famous because of the Coca Cola Company. thus, even if my proposal 
successfully	identifies	a	singular	proposition	as	the	target	of	the	intuitions	of	
truthfulness, it is not the proposition intuitively grasped by any competent 
speaker. in the next section, i tackle this and others objections.
5 Objections
I	 have	 claimed	 that	 in	 metafictive	 utterances	 such	 as	 (1)	 the	 speaker	
entertains	 a	 thought	 that	 is	 about	 the	file	SANTA	CLAUS	 itself,	while	 the	
hearer, if communication is successful, manages to form an analogous thought 
in	her	own	mind.	Now,	 this	 idea	 raises	 two	problems.	The	first	 one	has	 to	
do	with	the	intersubjective	identification	of	files:	if	my	picture	of	metafictive	
utterances is granted, speaker and hearer deploy thoughts each one about her 
own	file,	so	how	is	it	that	they	are	thinking	about	the	same	thing,	viz.	Santa	
Claus? the second problem is the following: it is not plausible that what the 
speaker	is	saying	in	uttering	(1)	is	that	her	own	file	became	famous	because	
of the Coca Cola Company. one might worry that the proposition we ended 
up	with	is	not	the	right	one,	for	it	seems	to	be	false	that	my	own	file	became	
famous because of the Coca Cola Company, while it seems to be true that 
Santa Claus became famous because of the Coca Cola Company. Let me begin 
with	the	first	problem.
The	problem	of	accounting	for	the	intersubjective	identification	of	files	
is very complex and is far beyond the goals of this article, but let me say at 
least	something.	The	idea	that	a	mental	file	can	be	shared	by	different	subjects	
is not in principle very controversial. if singular terms in the language can 
be	shared	and	mental	files	are	 the	mental	 counterparts	of	 singular	 terms,	 it	
does	not	seem	crazy	to	believe	that	mental	files	can	also	be	shared.	There	are	
at	least	two	different	ways	of	elaborating	this	idea.	On	the	one	hand,	Stacie	
Friend	(2011,	ms)	presents	a	Perry/Evans	inspired	informational	account	of	
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how	different	 individuals	 can	 share	 a	notion (in Friend’s account, a notion 
is	pretty	much	like	a	mental	file:	it	is	a	cognitive	particular	which	is	about	a	
single individual, and it’s used to bundle information about it). According to 
this	account,	when	different	individuals	think	about	Santa	Claus	they	deploy	
different	 tokens of the same notion type. What makes it the case that two 
tokens are tokens of the same notion is that they are embedded in the same 
notion-network. non-referring notion-networks originate in an author’s freely 
created representation, i.e., a notion, associated to freely created information 
to identify and track characters in stories. non-referring notion-networks are 
individuated, according to Friend (ms, section 6) by their dominant source of 
information. in order to develop this idea, Friend appeals to evans’ distinction 
between	producers	and	consumers.	Producers	are	all	those	subjects	that	can	
legitimately introduce information about x in a network about x. in the case of 
non-referring	networks	such	as	those	originated	in	myths	and	works	of	fiction	
which individuals are producers hinges on heavily context-dependent social 
rules	 and	 conventions.	 This	 is	 compatible	 with	my	 account	 of	 metafictive	
utterances.	Thus,	when	I	say	to	my	son	‘Santa	Claus	is	a	fictional	character’	
what grants that communication is successful, even though i have in mind a 
proposition	that	is	about	my	own	file	and	my	son	has	in	mind	a	proposition	
that	is	about	his	own	file	is	that	our	files	are	embedded	in	the	same	notion-
network,	that	is,	the	information	in	the	files	dominantly	derives	from	legitimate	
producers.
On	the	other	hand,	Sainsbury	(2005)	and	Salis	(2013)	defend	a	different	
account based on the idea of name-using practices. A name-using practice 
is the activity performed in a certain linguistic community of using a name 
that is about one and the same thing or that purports to be about one and 
the same thing. According to Sainsbury’s approach, name-using practices are 
individuated by baptisms and baptisms can be empty. two tokens are tokens 
of the same name if they participate in the same name-using practice, that is, 
if they have the same origin. in addition, proper names are associated with 
mental	files,	which	can	be	identified	in	terms	of	the	names	to	which	they	are	
associated. now, this account is also compatible with my own. Singular terms 
elicit	mental	files,	which	are	their	mental	counterparts.	On	this	account,	I	have	
a	Santa	Claus’	file	which	is	associated	to	the	name	‘Santa	Claus’,	a	name	that	
participates in a given name-using practice. When i say to my son ‘Santa Claus 
is	a	fictional	character’,	he	forms	his	own	Santa	Claus’	file,	upon	hearing	my	
token	of	the	name	Santa	Claus.	My	son’s	Santa	Claus	file	is	the	same	as	mine	
(that	is,	is	a	different	token	of	the	same	type)	because	it	was	originated	upon	
hearing a token of a name that participates in the same name-using practice 
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that the token of the name upon which i myself formed my own Santa Claus’ 
file.	So	the	important	point	is	that	the	problem	of	intersubjective	identification	
does not seem pressing for my account, for there are two main strategies for 
accounting for it and both are compatible with my account. 
The	second	problem	was	that	the	content	I	identified	does	not	seem	to	be	
the	right	one,	for	it	seems	to	be	clearly	false,	for	example,	that	my	own	file	
became famous because of the Coca Cola Company, while (1) is intuitively 
true.	The	problem	is	that	mental	files	are	mental	particulars	(to	which	only	I	
can have access), and it doesn’t seem right to claim that when i say something 
like (1) i’m talking about my own private representations, to the contrary, 
i must be talking about a representation that is public and shared by other 
members of the community. the answer to this problem is related to the 
answer	to	the	first	one.	Although	mental	files	are	mental	particulars,	so	that	
my	own	Santa	Claus’	file	is	different	from	everybody	else’s,	they	are	all	tokens	
of	the	same	type.	So	when	I	entertain	a	thought	about	my	file	SANTA	CLAUS	
i manage to entertain a thought about a representation that is public and shared 
at least by my audience, be that because it is part of the same notion-network, 
as in Friend’s approach, or because it participates in the same name-using 
practice, as in Sainsbury’s (choose your preferred theory). thus, when i 
entertain	a	thought	about	SANTA	CLAUS	I’m	having	thoughts	about	a	public	
representation type, although i can only do that by deploying a particular token 
of that representation in my head and making it the object of my thinking.
6 Conclusion 
In	this	article	I	attempted	to	solve,	within	the	framework	of	mental	files,	a	
problem that concerns any theory that combines referentialism and a russellian 
view	of	propositions	with	an	antirealist	stance	regarding	fictional	characters.	
i claimed that postulating a closed metarepresentational function for mental 
files	can	help	us	solve	the	problem.	With	this	in	mind,	I	argued	that	metafictive	
utterances pragmatically convey a closed metarepresentational thought, that 
is,	a	thought	where	the	file	that	corresponds	to	the	singular	term	in	the	sentence	
becomes the topic of discourse. the proposition pragmatically conveyed, i 
contended, is the one that accounts for the intuitions of truthfulness. Finally, i 
tackle	some	possible	objections	concerning	the	intersubjective	identification	
of	files	and	the	general	plausibility	of	the	account.
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